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that have filed for an initial public offering (IPO).  We found three distinct groupings 
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INTRODUCTION 
Technological innovation is of increasing importance to practitioners and 
scholars.1,2,3  It has been suggested that technological innovations can either sustain or 
disrupt both firms and industries,4,5 with the creation and adoption of technological 
innovations mainly being portrayed as leading firms toward competitive advantage6,7 and 
profitability.8 Disruptive innovations or technologies, specifically, are vehicles that new 
entrants can use to overcome barriers to entry within a market-sector.9  Disruptive 
innovations are technologies, products, or processes that creep up from below an existing 
business or industry and threaten to displace it,4,10 with disruptive innovations often 
leading to new industry creation.4,9  This is because a disruptive innovation 
fundamentally changes “the nature of the problem pursued, the material technology 
employed, and/or heuristics used to approach the problem.”11 The purpose of this paper is 
to examine how new firms in the emerging, disruptive technology industry of 
biotechnology intend to manage this transformation within the bio-pharmaceutical 
market-sector. 
Prahalad12 has suggested that researchers need to think differently about new 
practices in emerging markets.  Williams13 has provided one such view of new practices 
within the biotechnology industry.  Williams13 has created a typology describing how 
biotechnology IPOs intend to compete.  This typology of biotechnology firm intention 
and activity, however, has not been verified.  The focus of this paper is to briefly describe 
and test this typology (creating strategic groupings) and use it as a framework to explore 
an aspect of Prahalad‟s12 perspective of market influence in emerging industries.  
 




Typology and Strategic Groups 
 
Hatten, Schendel, and Cooper14 have noted that a crucial question for the 
strategist is how to position the firm‟s resources in light of its competitors.  A firm‟s 
initial strategic positioning may affect not only the firm‟s ability to reposition itself 
subsequently,15,16 but also its future financial performance.17 Many biotechnology IPOs 
are recently formed or newly forming firms.  The IPO process gives a rare glimpse into 
the firm‟s thinking about its strategic positioning within an industry.  
Williams13 explores this positioning question related to biotechnology IPOs and 
provides a typology based upon the strategic groupings‟ literature18,19,20,21  as his 
theoretical basis.  As Zinn, Aaronson, and Rosko22 observe, “[s]trategic group theory 
assumes that all firms in an industry face the same competitive environment and that 
differences in organizational capabilities account for differences in strategic behavior.”  
Acknowledging that debate remains within this literature,23 Williams13 argues that 
strategic groups do exist within this industry, and that nascent biotechnology firms 
choose a positioning strategy early in their formative years. 
Williams‟13 strategic group typology uses the dimensions of growth and 
competitive scope.  By growth, he13 means that the IPO‟s strategy is concerned with 
expansion via internal (organic) operations or by way of acquisitions of other firms or 
technologies.  Firm growth is an assumed objective of any entrepreneurial firm.24,25 
Competitive scope relates to the question of how broadly a firm should serve the market 
they are entering.26  By broad competitive scope, Williams13 does not mean 
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diversification outside of an industry, but rather, “the number of products, technologies, 
places on the value chain, and also diseases that a particular biotechnology firm seeks to 
make or pursue.”  This is consistent with Stern and Henderson‟s27 within-business 
diversification perspective.  The healthcare, strategic management, technology, and 
entrepreneurship literatures are replete with examples of strategic groupings.28,29,30,31  
Yet, the application of the strategic group literature to biotechnology and technologically-
oriented healthcare firms remains heretofore unexplored.13  
Williams‟13 typology consists of four strategic types: Sowers, Appliers, 
Collectors, and Scavengers (See FIGURE 1).  Sowers compete within the strategic 
dimensions of internal growth and focus.  For the sower, the IPO is primarily a means to 
raise additional capital in pursuit of the discovery and development of a drug for a 
particular disease. 13 Appliers compete within the strategic dimensions of internal growth 
and broad competitive scope.  For the applier, the IPO may act as a means to raise capital 
to get it through the clinical trial phase or other embryonic adoption phase while also 
seeking additional uses of its technology.13  Collectors compete within the strategic 
dimensions of acquisition and focus.  For the collector, the IPO may represent that (1) its 
internal technology or process is limited, or (2) it may be acting in a consolidator‟s role 
within a market segment (i.e., as a “roll-up” firm that is trying to achieve greater size 
within its market segment).  For example, within the pharmaceutical industry, 
acquisitions have played a major role for existing firms to gain additional resources.32,33  
Scavengers compete along the strategic dimensions of acquisitions and broad competitive 
scope.  This may be to: (1) acquire technology applicable to multiple market segments, 
(2) acquire a competitive advantage in an area lacking by the scavenger, or (3) act as a 
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consolidator, acquiring firms along a given market‟s (e.g. disease‟s) value chain.  Thus, 
we hypothesize: 
 H1: Biotechnology IPOs will differ based on the strategic dimensions of growth 




The first biotechnology company to offer an IPO was Genentech in October of 
1980.34 As of the end of 2004 there were approximately 330 publicly traded and 1,100 
private biotechnology firms in the U.S.35  The emergence of the biotechnology industry 
represents a technological discontinuity or disruptive innovation that has challenged the 
pharmaceutical industry,36 with the pharmaceutical industry being a $230 billion industry 
in the U.S. in 200437 and intensely competitive.33,38  Biotechnology products and services 
have the potential to supplant other healthcare segments such as radiation oncology and 
certain surgical procedures.  Furthermore, Foster9 observes that biotechnology has been 
suggested as part of a new fifth Kondratiev wave.  Kondrateiv waves or grand super-
cycles are the belief that waves of innovation have occurred over the last 250 years in 50-
year cycles that have transformed society, with the first four cycles involving coal and 
steam power, the mechanization of production, electric power, and electronics. 
 Pharmaceuticals are drugs for “human consumption, specifically developed to 
impact a disease, which goes through a regulatory process designed to approve 
prescription medications for marketing to physicians.”39 Pharmaceutical companies are 
typically chemistry-based firms that are ordinarily concerned with the identification of 
small molecules that bind to targets and cause a biological process to stop or start.39,40 
Biotechnology, on the other hand, began as the merger of biology and engineering—
“using „molecular scissors‟ to cut out genes and splice them into another organism‟s 
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DNA.”34  This recombinant DNA segment then interprets the “genetic code and produces 
large amounts of a protein useful in treating disease.”41  In this sense, biotechnology has a 
competency destroying effect42,43 on pure pharmaceutical firms.  In 2004, biotechnology 
firms developed about 15 percent of the top 200 drugs globally.35  The benefits of 
biotechnology products have often exceeded the chemical-based products and have 
treated diseases where previously there have not been pharmaceutical products 
developed.  The biotechnology industry also has evolved beyond genetic engineering to 
include technology firms in medical therapeutics, diagnostics, agriculture/biological 
products, and research tools.44  As Decarolis and Deeds45 observe, this is “a confluence of 
disciplines very unlike traditional pharmaceutical companies.” 
Whether made by pharmaceutical or biotechnology firms, decisions about which 
drugs or technologies to develop are made in the context of four domains: scientific 
opportunity, market assessment, resource development requirements, and medical need.46  
The development cost of a new drug is in excess of $800 million, with it taking 12 to 15 
years from discovery to commercialization.47  Because of the time factor, costs, and a 
lack of core competencies, many pharmaceutical firms have “outsourced” significant 
portions of their R&D efforts to smaller, newer biotechnology firms.48  Industry experts 
suggest that over 65 percent of today‟s bio-pharmaceuticals in the clinical “pipeline” 
exist within the biotechnology industry.49  These outsourcing efforts or strategic alliances 
have become the single largest source of financing for biotechnology firms.50  
Market Influence 
 
Prahalad12 has observed that new industry formation requires new ways of 
thinking.  This may be especially true for firms in unstructured industries such as 
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biotechnology.43 Within this emerging industry paradigm, Prahalad12,51 has suggested that 
industries evolve through three phases of competition.  These phases include competition 
for:  (1) intellectual leadership, (2) a coalition of partners that support a standard, and (3) 
market share for end-products and profits.  Prahalad12 also implies that creating market 
influence within the first two stages may be a good indicator of profitability in the third 
stage.  The creation and ownership of a standard is one method of market influence.   
The biotechnology industry remains in this second phase (however without the 
development of standards) and will be for some time.37,41,49  Hamel and Prahalad51 have 
suggested that during this second phase firms often compete to influence migration paths 
or trajectories.3,52  Trajectories are paths from today‟s market to where the future lies in 
end-products and profitability.  When competing in this manner, the firm‟s goal is to 
maximize its “share of influence over the trajectory of industry development.” 51  Hamel 
and Prahalad51 note that there are four main ways that firms influence their trajectory.  
These include the firm‟s: (1) capacity to build coalitions, (2) ability to build core 
competencies consistent with new opportunities, (3) ability to quickly develop and 
accumulate market learning (i.e., the ability to understand new industry dynamics), and 
(4) global share of mind or brand presence.  To this list, they51 add that certain other 
factors influence the trajectory as well.  These include the ability to:  (1) shape the 
regulatory market, (2) influence the development of technical standards, and (3) control 
intellectual property rights.   
Based on the biotechnology literature, we believe that certain factors may be more 
applicable and attainable than other factors.  For example, it is unlikely that the 
regulatory market for bio-pharmaceutical products in the U.S. is going to change 
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substantially in the near future.53 Industry experts49,54 do not believe that a definitive 
technological standard (or cluster of standards) will develop in this industry due to its 
complexity and the organic nature of human beings.  We believe that Pammolli and 
Riccaboni‟s54 observation about pharmaceuticals applies to biotechnology as well: 
“[t]here does not seem to be a durable, long-term first-mover advantage that can be 
exported to a different drug class.  This has hindered the persistence of dominant 
positions and limited industry concentrations.”  
Although firms may not be able to create a standard or change the regulatory 
market, the outcome related to the building of coalitions remains significant.33,44  Pharma-
ceutical firms create strategic alliances with biotechnology firms for two reasons: to 
block competitors and to act as substitutes for internal innovations.36  Biotechnology 
firms, on the other hand, have used strategic alliances to gain access to capital,34 
complementary assets,50,55 and knowledge.45  It is within this context that both 
biotechnology and pharmaceutical firms seek to influence the trajectory of the market.   
We agree with Prahalad12 that gaining access to strategic alliance partners is the 
first step toward market influence in this market-sector.  Williams13 suggests that 
biotechnology IPOs may strategically position themselves in order to affect strategic 
alliance development.  Acquisitions, for one, may give the new firm the critical mass to 
survive and prosper within these alliances.13,34  
Additionally, for many biotechnology firms, their goal is to use alliances with 
pharmaceutical firms to gain access to capital long enough to become a fully integrated 
bio-pharmaceutical company (FIPCO).  A FIPCO is a company that controls an 
innovation from discovery to commercialization.13,35,49   A FIPCO is then a direct 
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competitor to many pharmaceutical firms in the bio-pharmaceutical market-sector.  For 
example, Amgen and Genentech (both of which are biotechnology firms) are well known 
FIPCOs.  Today, Amgen and Genentech both invest in other biotechnology firms.  
FIPCOs may be similar to Williams‟13 Appliers and Scavengers, but without the 
dimension of acquisitions.  In addition to pursuing strategic alliances in order to gain 
capital, complementary assets, and knowledge, we believe that these firms also use 
multiple strategic alliances to lessen the influence that investors may have on them.  This 
is to say that these firms by having multiple partners may be able to limit the impact of 
one partner‟s withdrawal of funds and/or mitigate the ability of one partner to acquire 
them.  Their goal from the beginning is not to be a niche player, but a FIPCO.  Thus, their 
strategic intent is to use strategic alliances not as a potential exit strategy, but rather as a 
means to becoming a FIPCO.  Given these factors, we hypothesize: 
H2: Biotechnology IPOs that seek greater breadth in competitive scope and 
growth will have more alliance partners. 
 
The Empirical Study 
 
A number of studies show that filings with regulators reflect management‟s 
perceptions, intentions, and actions.56  Our study represents biotechnology firms that filed 
with the U.S. Security & Exchange Commission (SEC) to offer common stock to the 
public for the first time.  Our sample represents all known U.S. biotechnology firms that 
went public in the U.S. between the years 1996 and 2003.  We collected names of 
biotechnology IPOs from several different publicly available sources (e.g. Edgar-
Online.com, Ernst & Young‟s Healthcare Sector, Bio.org, Biospace.com, 
IPOresources.com, and the sec.gov).  Additionally, we reviewed all news articles from 
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the late 1990s through December 31, 2003 related to public offerings from Biospace.com 
to ensure that we were capturing all biotechnology IPOs.   
As biotechnology does not have its own standard industrial classification (SIC) 
codes, we then limited the firms in our study to a sub-set of IPOs within the SIC codes of 
2834 (Pharmaceutical Preparations), 2835 (In Vitro & In Vivo Diagnostic Substances), 
2836 (Biological Products), and 8731 (Services-Commercial Physical & Biological 
Research).  The firms included in the sample represent firms directly involved in the drug 
or therapeutics discovery/ production segment, but not complements within the industry 
(i.e., software companies within the biopharmaceutical market-sector) nor pharmaceutical 
companies or pure contract research organizations (CROs).  The firms in the study 
described themselves as biotechnology or biopharmaceutical firms.  It should be noted 
that we also excluded from our sample companies that were primarily “plant and animal” 
biotechnology firms (though a few firms included in the study did state in their SEC 
filings that there may be uses for their technology within the plant and animal segments).  
Our final sample represents 84 firms. 
Language from the Business Overview, Use of Proceeds, and Strategy sections of 
each IPO‟s prospectus was compiled.  Based on this language, content analysis was 
performed by five individuals rating the dimensions of competitive scope and growth.  
Several writers have argued that content analysis is a useful and valid approach to 
organizational analysis.57,58   Three raters had over 10 years direct healthcare business 
experience, including extensive responsibility for areas related to the dimensions of 
competitive scope and growth for their respective organizations, with the two other raters 
being MBA students.  Four items were used to measure the competitive scope of each 
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IPO.  These were: (1) range of products, (2) range of technologies, (3) broadness of 
market segments (i.e., diseases), and (4) places on its value chain (i.e., research and 
development to commercialization).  Four items were used to measure the strategic 
dimension of growth.  These were: (1) internal development of proprietary technology, 
(2) acquisition of technology, (3) acquisition of external property rights, and (4) 
acquisition of other firms.  We provided a copy of Williams‟13 typology paper to the 
raters and a few sample examples of how one might rate these statements.  Definitions 
were provided and a seven point Likert scale was used for each measure (See 
APPENDIX A).  Overall reliability was deemed acceptable (α = .89), with reliability for 
each item also found acceptable (i.e., each question‟s α > .60).  We used the means from 
the raters‟ responses for each item in the analysis.   
We use the age, size (total assets), initial amount sought to be raised by the IPO, 
percentage of equity held by pre-IPO owners after the IPO, stage of development of the 
most advanced product (i.e., clinical trials), number of patents owned by the IPO, lead 
underwriter reputation, and venture capital investment—all at the time of the IPO—as 
external variables to further validate the groupings.  These data are found primarily in the 
IPOs‟ prospectuses or annual (10K) filings (and their amendments).  For venture capital 
investors, we cross-matched individuals and firms found in the firm‟s prospectus with 
Pratt‟s Guide to Venture Capital Sources (1996-2003 eds.).59  We use the “tombstone” 
underwriter reputation ranks provided by Carter, Dark, and Singh.60  For the few 
underwriters within our study that are not ranked by Carter, Dark, and Singh, 60 we use 
the Carter and Manaster61 tombstone method to determine the underwriter‟s ranking.   
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Consistent with Prahalad‟s12 coalition view and Lerner and Merges50 observation, 
our measure for market influence is number of strategic alliances with pharmaceutical 
firms.  This variable is found in the biotechnology firm‟s prospectus, specifically in the 
Collaborative Arrangement, Sources of Revenue, and Dependence of Collaborative 
Partners sections.  
ANALYTICAL METHOD 
We performed a finite mixture model (latent class analysis) using the eight items 
as possible indicators of discrete groups of firms.  Finite mixture modeling is a 
probabilistic, model-based clustering approach used for identifying mutually exclusive 
categorical latent groups within a population based on the patterns of responses for a set 
of observed measures.62  We chose finite mixture modeling as it provides a more 
principled statistical approach than other clustering methods,63 and can be used as an 
exploratory or confirmatory procedure that accommodates observed indicators that are 
continuous, ordered or unordered categorical, counts, or any combination of these 
metrics.64  Additionally, an important use of latent class analysis has been the analysis of 
typologies.64   
Our goal was to assess how well the eight different rating items could identify 
distinguishable groups of firms.  The firms identified as belonging to each identified 
group are considered relatively similar (homogeneous) with respect to how they were 
rated on the eight indicator items.  We expected that across the identified groups there 
would be statistically significant differences with respect to how they were rated on each 
indicator.  We used the Mplus statistical program to perform the analysis.65 
RESULTS 
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Insert TABLE 1 About Here 
________________________ 
We ran a series of models consisting of different groupings.  Several fit criteria 
were used to evaluate these models and to assess the utility of the different indicators.  
The fit statistics including the Log Likelihood (LL) and Bayesian Information Criterion 
(BIC) for models consisting of 3 or 4 latent groups were found to be reasonable.  The 
model with four groups provided a better fit to the data.  All indicators except internal 
development of proprietary technology (Q5) were statistically significant as 
differentiators of firm groups.  We therefore discarded Q5 and re-ran the series of 
models.  We again found that the 4-group model provided the best fit to the data; 
however, this model was not appreciably different from a model consisting of three 
groups.  Because the distribution was very uneven with the 4-group model (i.e., there 
were only six firms in the fourth group), we decided to retain the 3-group model.  We 
examined model diagnostics to evaluate the required assumption of conditional 
independence (i.e., all indicators are uncorrelated given group membership), and made a 
small number of modifications to the model (i.e., we allowed the error variances for four 
variables to vary).  These changes provided a final model that fit the data well in terms of 
having the lowest BIC and LL.  TABLE 2 presents the findings from the 3-group model 
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related to the fit of the model.  TABLE 3 presents the findings related to the 3-group 




Insert TABLE 2 About Here 
________________________ 
________________________ 
Insert TABLE 3 About Here 
________________________ 
From the “Classification Table” within TABLE 2 and the “Group Size” within 
TABLE 3, it is apparent that there are three groups of firms confirming our first 
hypothesis that there is a difference among the firms.  The “Group Size” from TABLE 3 
shows that 39 of the 84 firms (or 45 percent) belong to Group 1; 32 firms (or 38 percent) 
belong to Group 2; and 13 firms (or 17 percent) belong to Group 3.  The “Classification 
Table” (within TABLE 2) shows the modal assignment and the probabilistic assignment.  
This section depicts that it is possible to have some probability of firms belonging to 
different groups  As this section shows, this is not a significant issue for these firms and 
groupings. 
Within TABLE 3, and in each group column, is the mean rating for each “Indicator” 
for the firms in that group.  Within this method, it is always important to consider the 
entire pattern with respect to these variables.  The ratings for firms in Group 3 shows a 
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profile that reflects higher average ratings for almost every indicator item (all except 
Q7—acquisition of external property rights).  Conversely, the profile of firms in Group 1 
reflects average ratings that are, with the exception of Q3 (broadness of market 
segments), the lowest.  Group 2 has average ratings that generally fall between the two 
extremes (except for Q7 where firms in this group have the highest rating and for Q3 
where they have the lowest average ratings).  FIGURE 2 represents the “rescaled” means 
for the indicator questions and provides a graphical representation of the three groups 
across the indicators.   
________________________ 
Insert FIGURE 2 About Here 
________________________ 
To link with Williams13 typology, we averaged the individual indicators for each 
of our dimensions (e.g. competitive scope and growth) by group, noting that we had 
deleted one of our measures (Q5) from our final results.   We then plotted these 
dimensional averages using the dimensions of growth and competitive scope. In taking 
the mean of the dimensions collectively, we found similar results to the above in that 
Group 1 has relatively low average indicators for both growth via acquisitions and 
competitive scope.  Group 2 has relatively low average indicators for competitive scope 
but high growth via acquisition indicators.  Group 3 has relatively high average indicators 
for competitive scope but relatively low growth via acquisition indicators.  In examining 
the overall averages of these indicators, we associate Group 1 with Sowers, Group 2 with 
Collectors, and Group 3 with Appliers.  Under the heading of “Covariates” within 
TABLE 3 are the conditional means for quantitative variables (i.e., given group 
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membership) or probabilities for a qualitative/categorical variable of having different 
values (being in different categories) for the categorical variable.  For example, the 
conditional probability of a value of 1 for venture capital involvement for Group 1 is 78% 
whereas the probability of a value of 0 is 1-78% or 22%.  We compare these probabilities 
across groups and see differences between the groupings and covariates.  This principle 
also applies when there are more than two categories.  These covariates act as external 
variables providing additional validity to the distinctiveness of our groupings. In other 
words, the more differences there are between groups and covariates the more assurance 
we can have that different groups exist.  We can use Group 1 which has limited 
competitive scope and grows primarily through internal means as the comparison group 
(i.e., it has low mean indicators for both dimensions compared to the other two groups).   
At a minimum, firms in Group 2 are pursuing greater growth by acquisitions and firms in 
Group 3 are pursuing greater competitive breadth.  From this perspective, the biggest 
effects when comparing Group 1 to the other two groups  are in the areas of venture 
capital involvement, age (1st and 4th quartiles), total assets (> 10,000,000), amount to be 
raised (> 60,000,000), number of patents (0, 1; and >10), and underwriter reputation.  
Finally, we hypothesized that groups pursuing broader competitive scope and growth via 
acquisition would attract a greater number of strategic partners.  Our findings indicate 
that firms in Group 3 have a 38 percent probability of having four or more strategic 
alliance partners.  This compares with 23 percent for Group 1, but also 40 percent for 
Group 2.  If we look at Group 3, we can also see that there is nearly a 60 percent 
probability of this group‟s members having 3 or more partners compared to 46 percent 
for Group 2 and 43 percent for Group 1.  Thus, when the three groups and covariates are 
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compared collectively, the findings confirm the second hypothesis with Groups 2 and 3 
attracting more strategic alliance partners than Group 1.   
DISCUSSION 
 
Overall, our results provide modest support for the typology.  We found three 
distinct groupings, confirming the assumptions that biotechnology IPOs differed based on 
the dimensions of growth and competitive scope.  We also validated these groupings 
using external variables.  In addition, these groupings had different relationships with 
strategic alliances, with groups that competed on a broader competitive scope and eternal 
acquisitions basis having a greater probability of attracting strategic partners.   
 Not surprisingly, we found groups that we associate with Williams‟13 Appliers 
and Collectors having a greater probability of: (1) being older, (2) having greater size, (3) 
seeking a larger amount of funding at the IPO, and (4) having more patents.  
Interestingly, Sowers had a greater probability of having venture capital investors than 
both Appliers and Collectors.  This is especially fascinating in light of the fact that 
Sowers also have the least probability among the three groups of attracting three or more 
strategic partners.  An interpretation of this result might be that venture capitalists are 
supplying their own funds, limiting the influence of strategic alliance partners, and 
seeking to exit the venture by way of the IPO. 
 Our final 3-group model did not provide any Scavengers, those firms with broad 
competitive scope and a desire to acquire other technologies and firms.  This may be 
because the capital requirements to become such may be too great at this stage of the 
firm‟s life cycle.  Akin to this, we found the Collectors‟ stated desire to pursue 
acquisitions of technology, property rights, and other technology firms to be modest.  
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Taken together, this suggests that there may be greater interplay between the 
communications with strategic partners and those of future investors associated with an 
IPO than initially stated in the Williams13 typology.  In other words, IPOs simultaneously 
have to attract both strategic partners (i.e., pharmaceutical and other biotechnology firms) 
and also other investors such as private investors, venture capitalists, and equity 
investors.  Whereas, private investors may wish to see acquisitions as part of a firm‟s 
strategic intent, pharmaceutical firms may not, knowing that that they (the 
pharmaceutical firm) can also act in this capacity.  Therefore, there may be a balancing 
act with respect to communicating strategic intent related to acquisitions to alliance 
partners and other investors.  This may also be related to these firms‟ relationships with 
venture capitalists as described above. 
 We found that Appliers and Collectors had a greater probability of attracting those 
underwriters with a greater reputation.  This is significant from the perspective that 
underwriter reputation also could be used as a measure of market influence.  Underwriter 
reputation has been shown to correlate with stock price, with the selection of underwriters 
usually occurring relatively close to the time of the IPO.69  This is especially interesting 
in light of our findings related to venture capital involvement (i.e., Sowers have a greater 
probability of attracting venture capitalists) and the extant research that has shown firms 
with venture capital investment typically attract those underwriters with greater 
reputations.  This seems to indicate that underwriters that are more prestigious are 
attracted to Collectors and Appliers, whereas venture capitalists are more attracted to 
Sowers.  From the biotechnology strategist‟s perspective, this may be a critical finding 
and area of further research interest for the strategist and entrepreneur.  As Williams, 
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Duncan, and Ginter70 have shown, firms with venture capital investment typically lessen 
the influence of the founding entrepreneurs in terms of board involvement and replacing 
the chief executive officer/entrepreneur.  Consistent with this, our findings may suggest 
that venture capital involvement also limits the strategic intent of these firms.  Thus, we 
think that these groups and their characteristics are important to not only researchers in 
their understanding of the general dynamics of this market-sector, but to entrepreneurs as 
well. 
 Our study has several limitations.  As Ketchen et al.71 note, “configuration 
research may be most useful as an intra-industry concept.”  We do not know if our 
findings are generalizable to other industries, firms in industries at different stages of 
their life cycle, or firms in an industry that is expected to develop a standard.  Our study 
was also limited to a seven-year timeframe; thus, we do not know whether our 
characterizations apply to biotechnology firms that went public in other timeframes.  
Hence, we do not know if our results apply to the first biotechnology firms that went 
public in the fifteen-year period between 1980 and 1995. 
In addition, this setting lends itself to at least six other areas of further research.  
First, researchers need to know the long-term consequences of these different groups.  In 
other words, are there long-term performance differences (e.g. survival, 
product/technological development, financial performance) between Sowers, Appliers, 
Collectors, and Scavengers?  Second, research is needed with regard to migration within 
these types.  For example, we do not know to what extent (or with what ease/difficulty) 
Sowers become Appliers and the like.   
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Third, it would be useful to understand the differences between groups and their 
ability to control intellectual property rights (which may be yet another measure of 
market influence).  Lerner and Merges50 observe that the appropriate allocation of control 
rights is especially critical in coalitions between firms seeking to develop new 
technologies, with these control rights being a “central issue in the negotiations of 
alliances.”  Given this phase of industry development and the predominance of coalitions 
within this market-sector (e.g. bio-pharmaceuticals), the ability to control property rights 
within these alliances may be another (set of) indicator(s) of market influence.72  Fourth, 
it would be interesting to know if as this industry matured, if more or less strategic 
groupings developed—when do Scavengers appear in greater numbers.   
Fifth, we do not know if these groups attract different types of investors and 
strategic alliance partners.  In addition to filling in gaps in specific disease categories, 
pharmaceutical firms may invest in biotechnology firms for different reasons.  For 
example, a pharmaceutical firm without any core competency in biotechnology and that 
has been “late” in entering into strategic alliances with biotechnology firms may pursue 
Appliers and Collectors as opposed to Sowers.  This contrasts with those pharmaceutical 
firms that have been investing in biotechnology firms for some time and that may be 
looking only to invest in Collectors based on a lack of a given core competency or 
technique.  And similarly sixth, we have limited knowledge about how firms in an 
existing industry (e.g. pharmaceuticals) absorb and survive disruptive innovations, firms, 
and industries.  Are there different mechanisms employed by (and perhaps “types” of) 
existing firms to deal with disruptive innovations?  Attention to these issues will further 
our understanding of the typology, groupings, and market-sector. 
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 In conclusion, the present findings verify the existence of distinct groupings of 
biotechnology firms that have filed for a public offering of their stock.  We have argued 
and found support for differences in these groupings and their ability to attract strategic 
alliance partners.  Thus, in general, this study adds to our knowledge of firms in an 
emergent, disruptive technology industry; and specifically to our knowledge of the U.S. 
bio-pharmaceutical market-sector and the ability of different firms to attract strategic 
partners (and influence the market) based upon their group membership. 
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FIGURE 2 
Indicator Items/Questions Rescaled Means 
 
Q1 = Range of Products 
Q2 = Range of Technologies 
Q3 = Broadness of Market Segments 
Q4 = Places on the Value Chain 
Q6 = Acquisition of Technology 
Q7 = Acquisition of External Property Rights 
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TABLE 1 
Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlations 
 Mean SD (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) 
Range Products (1) 2.85 .96 --                
Range Technologies (2) 2.40 .68 .621**                
Broadness Market Segments (3) 3.35 1.12 .523** .519**               
Value Chain (4) 3.87 1.05 .385** .447** .279*              
Development 
Proprietary Technologies (5) 
5.49 .92 -.016 -.062 -.210 .054             
Acquisition Technologies (6) 2.56 1.21 .202 .301** .136 .097 -.174            
Acquisition Property Rights (7) 2.65 1.33 .240* .219* .039 .105 -.147 .894**           
Acquisition Firms (8) 2.01 1.11 .139 .313** .111 .150 -.069 .734** .645**          
Age (9) 7.25 5.97 .011 .047 .090 -.060 -.205 .192 .104 .224*         
Assets (10)± 29264 64682 .088 -.065 .041 .076 .025 .140 .090 .194 .452**        
Percentage Equity (11) 73.97 9.61 .166 .081 .026 .187 .238* -.055 .029 -.133 -.063 .193       
Clinical Trial Stage (12) 1.02 1.23 .072 -.100 -.185 .166 -.087 -.054 .027 -.042 -.084 -.110 .023      
Amount Raised (13) ± 58204 51432 .130 .081 .179 .089 .032 .306* .212 .126 .330** .349** .193 -.076     
Number of Patents (14) 46.67 327 .058 -.056 .033 .065 .045 .153 .131 .224* .216* .825** .168 -.086 .154    
Underwriter Reputation (15) 7.39 2.11 .208 .163 .133 .255* .134 .182 .239* .078 .011 .135 .423** .002 .255* .082   
Number Strategic Alliance 
Partners (16) 
2.66 2.32 .257* .169 .153 .202 .115 .112 .162 -.066 -.054 .103 .222* -.208 .168 .166 .155 -- 
N = 84      * Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed)      ** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed)   ± Mean and SD in thousands (000s) 
 






    
Log-likelihood (LL) -625.2958    
Log-prior -20.4370    
Log-posterior -645.7328    
BIC (based on LL) 1472.1325    
AIC (based on LL) 1350.5917    
AIC3 (based on LL) 1400.5917    
CAIC (based on LL) 1522.1325    
     
Classification 
Statistics 
Groups     
Classification errors 0.0242    
Reduction of errors 
(Lambda) 
0.9555    
Entropy R-squared 0.9249    
Standard R-squared 0.9354    
Classification log-
likelihood 
-631.7485    
AWE 1856.5786    
     
Classification Table Modal    
Probabilistic Group 1 Group 2 Group 3 Total 
Group 1 38.0548 0.2043 0.0250 38.2841 
Group 2 0.8017 30.9827 0.0452 31.8295 
Group 3 0.1435 0.8130 12.9298 13.8863 
Total 39.0000 32.0000 13.0000 84.0000 
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TABLE 3 
Indicators and Covariates 
 Group 1 Group 2 Group 3 
Group Size 0.4543 0.3784 0.1673 
    
Indicators    
Range of Products Mean (Q1) 2.6036 2.6950 3.9134 
Range of Technologies Mean (Q2) 2.1233 2.2746 3.4502 
Market Segments Mean (Q3) 3.1294 2.9537 4.8665 
Value Chain Mean (Q4) 3.6570 3.7612 4.7299 
Acquisition of Tech. Mean (Q6) 1.6061 3.3438 3.4336 
Acquisition Prop Rights Mean (Q7) 1.5943 3.6573 3.2804 
Acquisition of Firms Mean (Q8) 1.2389 2.6100 2.7722 
    
Covariates*    
Percentage Equity Mean 72.8490 75.0999 74.5080 
Venture Capital Involvement    
0 (No) 0.2216 0.3376 0.3437 
1 (Yes) 0.7784 0.6624 0.6563 
Stage of Clinical Trials    
0 (number) 0.5344 0.4948 0.4892 
1 0.1303 0.1236 0.2217 
2 0.2000 0.1982 0.1464 
3 0.0832 0.1825 0.0726 
4 stage 0.0521 0.0009 0.0701 
Age of IPO    
1st quartile 0.3413 0.3655 0.0936 
2 0.3229 0.3331 0.2186 
3 0.1289 0.0914 0.2994 
4th  quartile 0.2070 0.2100 0.3883 
Total Assets    
1 (< 1mil) 0.0773 0.0528 0.0259 
2 (>1 mil-10mil) 0.3902 0.2515 0.2921 
3 (>10mil-50 mil) 0.4548 0.6016 0.6079 
4 (>50mil) 0.0777 0.0941 0.0740 
Amount to Be Raised at IPO    
<30,000,000 0.3886 0.3692 0.1709 
30,000,000-60,000,000 0.3279 0.2247 0.3091 
>60,000,000 0.2835 0.4061 0.5200 
Number of Patents Held by IPO    
0, 1 0.4849 0.5056 0.2407 
2—10 0.2049 0.2882 0.3587 
>10 0.3102 0.2061 0.4007 
Underwriter Reputation    
Mean (orig scale) 7.0367 7.4719 8.2233 
Number of Strategic Alliances    
0 0.2081 0.1552 0.2227 
1 0.1760 0.2271 0.0743 
2 0.1792 0.1477 0.1034 
3 0.2066 0.0661 0.2151 
>=4 0.2301 0.4038 0.3843 
* Many of these covariates are recoded or rescaled 
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APPENDIX A 
Indicator Items or Questions 
Range of Products: The range (i.e., number) of different, distinct products that the IPO is either now or intends in 
the future to discover, develop, and/or commercialize (i.e., produce).
Range of Technologies: The range (i.e., number) of different, distinct technologies that the IPO is now or
intends in the future to discover, develop, and/or commercialize (i.e., produce).
Market Segments (Diseases): The range of diseases or treatment areas that the IPO either now or in the future 
intends to discover, develop, and/or commercialize (i.e., produce).
1          2        3        4          5         6          7
None Many
1          2        3        4          5         6          7
None Many
1          2        3        4          5         6          7
None Many
 
Value Chain Breadth: The places on the value chain that the IPO either now or in the future intends to compete 
(i.e., discovery, development, and/ or commercialization).
Development of Proprietary Technology: How focused (i.e., committed) is the IPO either now or in the future to 
developing its own, internal technology.
Acquisition of Technology: How focused (i.e., committed) is the IPO either now or in the future to buying 
technology from other firms.







1       2        3      4       5          6         7
1       2        3      4       5          6         7
Very Focused Not  Focused
Not Focused Very Focused
 
Acquisition of External Property Rights: How focused (i.e., committed) is the IPO either now or in the future to 
buying property rights to technologies, drugs, etc. from other firms.
Acquisition of Other Firms:  How focused (i.e., committed) is the IPO either now or in the future to buying other 
firms).
1       2         3          4        5         6           7
1       2         3          4        5         6           7
Not Focused Very Focused
Not Focused Very Focused
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